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Abstract
Gross capital inflows and outflows to and from emerging market
economies (EMEs) have witnessed a significant increase since early
2000s. This rapid increase in the volume of flows accompanied by
sharp swings in volatility has amplified the complexity of macroeco-
nomic management in EMEs. While capital inflows provide additional
financing for productive investment and offer avenues for risk diversi-
fication, unbridled flows could also exacerbate financial instability.In
this paper we focus on the evolution of capital flows in a few select
emerging Asian economies, and analyze surge and stop episodes as
well as changes in the composition of flows across these episodes. We
also provide a comprehensive description of the capital account man-
agement policies adopted by the host countries and evaluate the ef-
ficacy of these measures by analyzing whether they achieved the de-
sired goals.This kind of an analysis is highly relevant especially a time
when EMEs around the world are about to face the repercussions of
a potential Quantitative Easing (QE) tapering by the US or launch of
fresh QE measures by the Euro-zone, either of which could once again
heighten the volatility of cross-border capital flows thereby posing re-
newed macroeconomic challenges for major EMEs.
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1 Introduction
Emerging economies witnessed a sharp increase in capital flows in the pe-
riod during the last two decades. From around 2.6% of GDP in 2000, gross
capital inflows increased to a peak of 12.5% of GDP in the second quarter
of 2007. During the same period, net capital inflows surged from 1.25% of
GDP to over 6.5% of GDP. After collapsing during the 2008 global financial
crisis (GFC), capital flows to the emerging economic experienced a sharp
rebound in late 2009 and 2010. These created a number of macroeconomic
challenges and financial stability concerns to emerging market, forcing them
to undertake capital account management and macroprudential measures
to stem the flow of capital. The situation had reversed again by the end of
2011 and 2012, with the worsening of the global outlook driven by sovereign
debt rating downgrade of the United States in August 2011 and the exacer-
bation of the Eurozone crisis. This resulted in capital flows receding rapidly,
withering away the recent exchange rate gains and reserve accumulation.
This volatility in capital flows to emerging countries has again the reignited
the debate on allocation of flows to these economies. The drivers of these
capital flows are diverse, ranging from global, regional, contagion to domes-
tic factors. For example, Forbes and Warnock (2012) conclude that global
factors were a major driver of capital flows. In particular, global risk plays
a very important role in determining the periods of extreme capital flows
by domestic and foreign investors. Global risk impacts capital flows mainly
through changes in economic uncertainty, although changes in risk aversion
is also an important factor during periods of dramatic slowdown of foreign
capital. Apart from these, global growth also plays an important role in driv-
ing capital flows, especially by foreign investors. Ghosh et al. (2014) also
find evidence of global factors such as U.S. interest rates and risk aversion
to be more important factors driving capital flows to emerging economies
than growth differentials of these countries viz-a-viz advanced economies.
Another important factor in explaining capital flow is related to contagion,
which occurs through trade and financial linkages as well as regional con-
nections. Contagion helps explain episodes during which investors tend to
reduce investment abroad and return more money home. Finally, domestic
factors also play a role in influencing episodes of capital flows but these tend
to be lower than others. Among domestic factors, domestic growth shocks
are usually most important in determining the behavior of foreign investors.
However, for some selected Asian economies, Balakrishnan et al. (2013) ar-
gue that there is not a strong association between growth differentials of
these economies with advanced countries and equity inflows. Many of the
Asian economies faced equity outflows, implying that the favourable effect
of sizeable growth differentials was offset by the uncertainty related to the
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global outlook. In contrast, some of the selected Asian countries witnessed
a stronger relationship between bond flows and interest rate differentials.
Finally, there is little evidence of a significant effect of capital controls on
the likelhood of experiencing any type of extreme capital flow movement.
In this paper, we focus on the trend of capital inflows and outflows in se-
lected Emerging Asian Economies (EAEs) by analyzing the “waves” in cap-
ital flows. We also evaluate the composition of these waves, i.e. were the
flows driven by FDI flows, portfolio flows, bank and non bank flows, deriva-
tive flows or government flows. We then focus on the response of the host
countries to these waves of flows focusing both on the capital account man-
agement and macroprudential measures. Finally, we evaluate the efficacy of
these measures by analyzing if these measures achieved their desired goals.
2 Identifying Surge and Stop Episodes
In this section we document the broad trends in capital flows in selected
Asian emerging markets. We focus our analysis on five major emerging
economies of the region viz. India, Indonesia, Republic of Korea (henceforth,
Korea), Malaysia and Thailand. We focus on the period 1995q1 to 2011q4,
which provides us with a time series spanning 84 quarters.
Gross capital inflows have been extremely volatile in recent years in many
Asian economies. For example, inflow of foreign capital on account of net
purchase of Korean assets by foreigners through direct and portfolio in-
vestment, financial derivatives and other investment reversed from +$25.7
billion in Q2 2007 to -$22.6 billion (net sales) in Q3 2008. Similarly, even
in India, an economy used to relatively low fluctuations in capital inflows
due to limited capital account openness, net purchase of assets went down
from +$29.2 billion in Q4 2007 to -$1.6 billion (net sales) in in Q4 2008.
Following Forbes (2014) we formally assess the increase in volatility by cal-
culating the standard deviation of quarterly gross capital inflows over the
last eight quarters for our sample of countries. The results are shown in Fig-
ure 1. Given Korea’s significantly higher degree of volatility, compared to
the other economies, it has been measured on a different axis. It is quite evi-
dent that for all the countries we are focusing on, the period of the GFC was
characterized by significantly higher volatility in capital flows, compared to
earlier years. There was a steady increase in the volatility from early 2006,
and it reached a peak in the second half of 2008.
The volatility in the capital inflows have been driven both by periods of
“waves” of capital inflows. We use the methodology introduced by Forbes
and Warnock (2012) to identify the both periods of sharp changes in inflows.
We focus on “surges” and “stops”. While a surge is defined as a sharp
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increase in gross capital inflows, a stop implies a sharp decline in gross
capital inflows. Both these events are driven by foreigners buying or selling
domestic assets.
Figure 1: Volatility in Capital Inflows in Asia
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We compute episodes of capital flow surges and stops using the methodology
of Forbes and Warnock (2012) for the period 1995 to 2011. Details of the
calculations are in the Appendix in Section 4.1 at the end of the paper.
The various episodes of surges and stops, with their start and end dates are
tabulated in Table 1.
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Table 1: Surge and Stop Episodes for Selected Countries
Surges Stops
Start End Quarters Start End Quarters
India Q2 1996 Q1 1997 4 Q2 1998 Q3 1998 2
Q3 2003 Q2 2004 4 Q3 2008 Q3 2009 5
Q4 2004 Q3 2005 4
Q4 2006 Q2 2008 7
Q1 2010 Q4 2010 4
Indonesia Q2 1995 Q3 1996 6 Q4 1997 Q3 1998 4
Q4 2005 Q1 2006 2 Q4 2006 Q1 2007 2
Q4 2010 Q2 2011 3 Q1 2009 Q3 2009 3
Korea Q3 1994 Q4 1995 6 Q2 1997 Q3 1998 6
Q1 2008 Q2 2009 6
Malaysia Q4 2005 Q3 2006 4
Q3 2008 Q2 2009 4
Thailand Q2 1995 Q1 1996 4 Q3 1996 Q2 1998 8
Q3 2004 Q1 2006 7 Q1 2007 Q4 2007 4
Q3 2010 Q1 2011 3 Q3 2008 Q3 2009 5
Source: Forbes (2014), IMF’s International Financial Statistics and Authors’ Estimates.
In addition, Figure 2, superimposes these episodes with the evolution of
gross capital inflows and outflows as well as net inflows. Table 1 shows
that on aggregate these five Asian economies experienced an equal number
of 12 surge as well as stop episodes. Broadly, the surge episodes can be
divided into three periods. First was the period preceding the Asian financial
crisis (AFC) while the second took place prior to the GFC, while most
of the surge episodes were confined to these two crises periods. However,
there were differences at the individual country level. While, at five, India
experienced the most number of surge episodes, Malaysia did not witness
any surge episode. The stop episodes were more symmetrically distributed
with Indonesia and Thailand experiencing three episodes each and India,
Korea and Malaysia encountering two episodes each. India and Thailand
witnessed the longest surge episodes spanning over 7 quarters during the
period before the GFC, while Thailand witnessed the longest stop episode
during the AFC.
Figure 2 shows that the during the longest surge episodes experienced in
India between Q4 2006 and Q2 2008, there was an inflow in excess of $150
billion or an average of 7.6% of GDP. Similarly, though the surge episode
between Q3 2004 and Q1 2006 in Thailand was much more modest in volume,
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Figure 2: Net and Gross Flows to Asian Economies along with Surge and
Stop Episodes
-32
-24
-16
-8
0
8
16
24
32
1995q1 1997q1 1999q1 2001q1 2003q1 2005q1 2007q1 2009q1 2011q1
B
il
li
o
n
 U
S
D
Gross Capital Inflows
Gross Capital Outflows
Net Capital Flows
(a)India
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1995q1 1997q2 1999q2 2001q2 2003q2 2005q2 2007q2 2009q2 2011q2
B
il
li
o
n
 U
S
D
Gross Capital Inflows
Gross Capital Outflows
Net Capital Flows
(b)Indonesia
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
1995q1 1997q1 1999q1 2001q1 2003q1 2005q1 2007q1 2009q1 2011q1
B
il
li
o
n
 U
S
D
Gross Capital Inflows
Gross Capital Outflows
Net Capital Flows
(c)Korea
-20
-10
0
10
20
1999q1 2001q1 2003q1 2005q1 2007q1 2009q1 2011q1
B
il
li
o
n
 U
S
D
Gross Capital Inflows
Gross Capital Outflows
Net Capital Flows
(d)Malaysia
-10
-5
0
5
10
1995q1 1997q1 1999q1 2001q1 2003q1 2005q1 2007q1 2009q1 2011q1
B
il
li
o
n
 U
S
D
Gross Capital Inflows
Gross Capital Outflows
Net Capital Flows
(e)Thailand
Source: Forbes (2014), IMF’s Balance of Payment Statistics and Authors’ Estimates.
resulting in capital inflow of only $30 billion, these capital flows accounted
for nearly 9.3% of GDP. The stop episodes were equally diverse. While the
longest stop episode among these five economies involving Thailand during
the AFC led to sale of Thai assets by foreigners worth $4 billion or 2.4% of
GDP, Korea experienced sale of assets worth $130 billion or 11.5% of GDP
during the GFC.
Next, we focus on the composition of the gross inflows to get an idea of what
kind of flows influenced the surge and stop episodes. Figure 3 decomposes
6
the gross capital inflows (as a percentage of GDP) received by an economy
into FDI flows, portfolio debt flows, portfolio equity flows, bank and non-
bank flows, derivative flows and government flows. We focus on the period
Q1 1995 to Q4 2011. While for Indonesia, Korea and Thailand, the data is
available for the entire period, for India, the data begins in 1996, and for
Malaysia, the data begins in 1999.
In India, the first surge episode in the mid-1990s were primarily driven
by bank and non-bank flows, which accounted for nearly 60% of the gross
inflows coming into the country. This was driven by commercial borrowings
by Indian corporate sector, short-term trade credits and deposits by non-
resident Indians. These flows also played an important role in driving capital
flows during the surge episodes of Q4 2004 to Q3 2005 and Q4 2006 to
Q2 2008, when they accounted for more than 40% of total inflows. These
flows have been primarily encouraged by widening interest rate differential
between India and the advanced economies as well as greater liberalization
of borrowing norms. The other two surge episodes in 2000s, i.e. the ones
during Q3 2003 to Q2 2004 and Q1 2010 to Q4 2010 were driven by portfolio
equity flows, which accounted for 59.1% and 41% of the total flows. While
FDI inflows accounted for 25% to 30% of flows during these two episodes,
its contribution peaked at 38% during the longest surge episode that took
place from Q4 2006 to Q2 2008. Improved macroeconomic fundamentals
and easy global liquidity led to flow of global capital into India during 2003
to 2008, and again in 2010.
In Indonesia, FDI inflows were a big driver of capital flows, explaining nearly
50% of the capital inflows during the surge episodes of Q2 1995 to Q3 1996
and Q4 2010 to Q2 2011. In comparison, FDI inflows accounted for only
30% of total inflows during the short episode from Q4 2005 to Q1 2006. In
1989, Indonesia switched from a positive list for FDI to a negative list, which
was further pruned during the early 1990s. Indonesia experienced a boom in
FDI during 1995 and1996, with FDI doubling over previous years. Portfolio
debt flows also played an important role, accounting between one-quarter to
one-half of the total capital inflows. Again, similar to India, with domestic
interest rates tending to be much higher than foreign interest rates, there
were inducements for foreign borrowing and capital inflows. However, ex-
pected depreciation of the currency as well as country risk considerations
tempered some of the inflows. The post GFC period saw private inter-
national investors engaging into purchases of government bonds and Bank
Indonesia securities, with portfolio debt flows rising accounting for 38% of
aggregate capital inflows.
The only surge episode witnessed in Korea was in the mid-1990s, prior to
the onset of the AFC. This was driven mainly by bank and non-bank flows
and portfolio debt flows, which explained 56.9% and 28.3% of capital inflows
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Figure 3: Composition of Gross Capital Inflows
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Source: Forbes (2014), IMF’s Balance of Payment Statistics and Authors’ Estimates.
during Q3 1994 to Q4 1995. Portfolio equity flows accounted for 10.5% of
aggregate inflows. The worsening of the current account deficit in the early
1990s along with the requirements to join OECD resulted in the Korean
government significantly relaxing its control over the financial sector and
liberalizing management of the capital account. In particular, foreign in-
vestors were allowed to invest directly in Korea stock markets with some
ownership caps, foreigners were allowed to purchase government and public
bonds issued at international interest rates and equity-linked bonds could be
issued by small and medium firms. Norms for foreign commercial loans were
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also significantly eased, which led to an increase in short-term borrowing.
While Malaysia did not experience a surge episode during the period of the
study, Thailand witnessed three such episodes. The first one in the mid
1990s was driven exclusively by bank and non bank flows. This was a result
of progressive capital account liberalization in the early 1990s, with measures
such as increasing commercial banks’ net foreign liabilities from 20% to 25%
and allowing residents to undertake foreign exchange transactions directly
with commercial banks. In the second episode, lasting from Q3 2004 to Q1
2006, FDI inflows accounted for nearly half of the aggregate inflows, while
another 40% of inflows were in the form of portfolio equity flows while the
final episode was driven bank and non bank flows and portfolio debt flows.
The stop episodes were primarily concentrated during the periods of the
AFC (1997-98) and GFC (2008-2009). Barring India, all the other Asian
economies witnessed a significant sale of assets by foreigners during the
AFC. Much of the outflow of foreign capital took place through bank and
non-bank flows and portfolio debt flows. Radelet and Sachs (2000) point
out that these 4 East Asian economies, along with Philippines, witnessed
net private flows dropping from $93 billion in 1996 to -$12 billion in 1997,
, a swing of $105 billion or 9% of GDP. Out of this decline of $105 billion,
over $77 billion was due to commercial bank lending, while portfolio equity
and non-bank lending accounted for $24 billion and $5 billion.
In Thailand, the AFC resulted in massive outflow of foreign capital and
caused a dramatic depreciation of the Thai Baht. In the immediate after-
math of the crisis, FDI inflows continued to remain relatively robust and
averaged 4.5% of GDP between 1998 and 2001. However, there was a de-
cline from 2002 onwards, and FDI inflows recovered only in 2005. Portfolio
equity flows remained at a consistent low level between 1998 to 2004, aver-
aging only 0.6% of GDP. The magnitude of these flows increased after 2005
and averaged more than 2% of GDP between 2005 and 2007. Portfolio debt
flows experienced a negative trend between 1999 and 2005. These increased
after 2005, but continued to remain volatile and low. The imposition of Un-
remunerated Reserve Ratio in December 2006 led to a drop in these flows.
The biggest fall in capital inflows came from bank and non-bank inflows,
which remained negative till 2004.
Unlike the AFC, India was significantly impacted by the GFC of 2008-2009,
along with the other EAEs. From $100.6 billion in 2007, private capital
inflows to India dropped to $33.2 billion in 2008. Cumulatively, these five
economies witnessed private capital inflows declining from $223.7 billion to -
$15.6 billion. Of the reversal of $239.3 billion between 2007 and 2008, nearly
$150 billion was on account of bank lending while portfolio equity witnessed
a reversal of $67 billion. Non-bank lending also experienced a reversal of $23
billion. Thus both during the AFC and GFC, bank and non-bank inflows
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as well as portfolio equity inflows were the major channels of capital flow
reversal. FDI inflows remained fairly constant during these two crises. The
increase in global liquidity in the aftermath of the GFC as well as initial signs
of decoupling of emerging economies of Asia from the advanced economies
led to a revival of capital flows in later part of 2009, which continued till
2011. From a cumulative negative inflow of -$15.6 billion of in 2008, private
inflows to these 5 EAEs jumped to -$1.94 trillion in 2009, and further to
$2.15 trillion in 2010, before dropping to $1.89 trillion in 2012.
3 Policy Response to Manage Capital Inflows
Policymakers’ desire to prevent sharp surges in capital inflows stems from the
myriad of risks associated with these surges. These include macroeconomic
risks, financial stability risks, and finally risks associated with capital flow
reversal. Subramanian and Rajan (2005) and Prasad et al. (2007) show that
excessive capital inflows could result in rapid exchange rate appreciation,
which can hurt exports of emerging markets. Even a short-term appreciation
can have lingering implications in the form of permanent loss of export
market share and reductions in manufacturing capacity. Thus capital flow
surges can influence macroeconomic variables in a way that is inconsistent
with policy objectives such as price stability, exchange rate stability and
export promotion.
Capital inflows can also push up asset prices, reduce the quality of assets
and adversely affect maturity and currency composition of corporate balance
sheets, contributing to enhanced financial fragility. Prasad and Rajan (2008)
contend that in an underdeveloped financial system, foreign capital is likely
to be channeled towards easily collateralized, non-tradable investments like
real estate, leading to asset price booms, with subsequent busts severely
disrupting the economy. Foreign portfolio investment into shallow equity
markets also cause sharp valuation swings.
Finally, capital inflows can reverse themselves leading to a costly balance
of payments crisis. Schadler (2010) show that about 15% of capital inflow
episodes over the past two decades have resulted in a crisis.
In the case where capital flows are being driven largely by economic funda-
mentals, policymakers need to reconcile to the inevitability of allowing a real
exchange rate appreciation as it would result in a fundamental revaluation
of domestic assets relative to foreign assets. However, policymakers tend to
be reluctant to allow the real exchange rate to appreciate for a variety of
reasons. The most important concern tends to be loss of international price
competitiveness resulting in adverse balance of payments situation.
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In general, policymakers can resort to three broad macroeconomic measures
to counter the surge in capital inflows. These involve (i) enhancing exchange
rate flexibility, (ii) undertaking sterilized intervention, and (iii) imposing
controls on capital inflows. Below, we analyse the experience of the 5 selected
EAEs on these measures.
3.1 Enhancing Exchange Rate Flexibility
Enhancing exchange rate flexibility does not necessarily imply nominal ex-
change rate appreciation, something which the policymakers are reluctant
to allow. It refers to introducing two-way risks, and thereby discourage
speculative capital inflows. If a central bank responds to a capital inflows
over a period of time by continuing to intervene in the foreign exchange
market it can encourage more capital flows by introducing a one-way bet.
It signals investors that the domestic currency will appreciate in the near
future as and when the central bank cannot afford further intervention and
allows freer movement of the currency. At the same time, large stockpile of
reserves provides an assurance that large depreciation will not take place.
Introduction of two-way risks involve widening the band of fluctuation in
the case of de facto peg or a tightly managed float. The need to allow
greater freedom to the exchange rate in te face of enhanced capital inflows
is driven by the desire to retain monetary autonomy to be able to stabilizes
the economy in the face of domestic and exogenous shocks. This trade-off
stems from the classic open economy trilemma, which argues that argues
that it is impossible to attain monetary policy independence, exchange rate
stability and capital market integration simultaneously. Only two of the
three objectives can be obtained at a particular point in time. We use
empirical methods following Aizenman et al. (2010) to briefly describe the
experience of the EAEs with the impossible trinity, using quarterly data from
2000 Q1 to 2013 Q4. Details of the calculations are given in the Appendix,
in section 4.2.
With three indices across 5 countries, it is difficult to identify events that
would have resulted in a structural shift in these indices across all the
economies. Hence, to better understand the evolution of these indices, we
break the entire sample into three equal periods. While Period 1 lasts from
2000 Q1 to 2003 Q4, Period 2 covers 2004 Q1 to 2007 Q4, and Period 3
includes 2008 Q1 to 2011 Q4. We plot the means of the indices across these
periods in Figure 4.
Next, we examine the validity of the trilemma framework by testing whether
the weighted sum of the three trilemma policy variables adds up to a con-
stant, here set to be 2. The relevant equation is given in the Appendix in
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Figure 4: Configuration of the Trilemma Objectives and International Re-
serves
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section 4.2.1 and the results are given in Table 41 We estimate the rela-
tionship for the entire period 2000 Q1 to 2011 Q4. While the estimates for
exchange rate stability and capital account openness are significant across
all the specifications, it is not the case with monetary independence.
To obtain the contribution of each trilemma policy orientation we multiply
the coefficients with the average for each phase. The results are outlined in
Figure 5. The high goodness of fit implies that the contributions add up to
being close to 2 across all the phases for all the EAEs, barring Thailand.
We find that the 5 EAEs have managed the conflicting objectives of trilemma
in very different ways. Across the periods India has put greater emphasis
on monetary independence, whose weight increased from 22.4% in Period
I to over 70% in Period III as monetary policy was calibrated to manage
domestic inflationary pressures. This was offset by relinquishing exchange
rate stability whose weight steadily declined from 76.3% to 20.3%. Another
economy, which witnessed a decline in the exchange rate stability index was
Malaysia. From a weight of 92.6% in Period I when the Ringgit was pegged
to the US Dollar, the weight on exchange rate stability declined to below
60%. Like India, the decline in exchange rate stability was associated with
an increase in monetary independence. In both these economies, capital
account openness witnessed an increase in Period II, helped by loose global
liquidity and strong domestic macro fundamentals. However, the GFC, fol-
lowed by crisis in Europe, and deterioration in domestic macro indicators
led to a slump in capital flows in Period III.
Among the other EAEs, Korea has consistently put the most weight on
retaining monetary independence, followed by exchange rate stability. There
was some decline in the emphasis given to monetary independence in Period
II, when the economy experienced a rush of capital inflows prior to the
GFC resulting in an increase in capital account openness. The emphasis on
exchange rate stability has been fairly consistent across the periods.
In contrast, in Indonesia policymakers imparted greater weight to exchange
rate over time with a view to retain competitiveness, despite BI committing
to an inflation targeting framework in 2005. The dichotomy between mon-
etary and exchange rate management was achieved to some extent through
BI’s frequent intervention in the foreign exchange market to keep its ex-
change rate somewhere near what the central bank perceived to be equilib-
rium. This is evidenced from the ∆Res index, which is highest for Indonesia
among the 5 EAEs. This was associated with a declining weight on mon-
etary independence across the period. In the case of Thailand, there was
1If the Trilemma is indeed binding then a country, which chooses to implement any
2 of the 3 policy objectives perfectly will have to completely forego the third objective.
Hence in our analysis where all the trilemma objectives are normalized to lie between 0
and 1, the maximum combined value of the Trilemma indices can be 2.
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a decline in the weight given to exchange rate stability in Period II com-
pared to Period I, but increased considerably thereafter. These shifts were
offset by weights on monetary independence moving in the opposite direc-
tions. While the weight on capital account openness declined overtime in
Indonesia, it remained fairly constant in Thailand.
To summarize, the 5 EAEs have negotiated the trilemma in very different
manner as they were confronted with rising and volatile capital flows. In-
stead of adopting corner solutions, all the 5 EAEs adopted intermediate ap-
proach in negotiating the conflicting approaches of the well know Trilemma.
However, there is a distinct difference to the weights accorded to these ob-
jectives by the policymakers of these economies. While India and Malaysia
have chosen to sacrifice exchange rate stability in more recent years to have
greater freedom to exercise monetary policy, Indonesia and Thailand have
put greater emphasis on managing the exchange rate at the cost of monetary
policy. Korea has remained fairly consistent in managing the Trilemma, fo-
cusing on monetary independence followed by exchange rate stability. All
the 5 EAEs witnessed an increase in capital account openness in Period II,
which led to a drop in the other two indices.
3.2 Sterilized Intervention
One of the most commonly used instrument to counter a surge in capital
flows is sterilized intervention. This involves the central bank purchasing
the foreign capital inflows to resist an appreciation of the domestic currency,
and then exchanging domestic assets with foreign assets to neutralize the
increase in monetary base, arising from purchase of foreign capital. Thus
sterilized intervention allows countries experiencing a surge in capital inflows
to maintain nominal exchange rate while also preventing the capital inflow
from increasing the base money. Reinhart and Reinhart (1998) refer to
sterilized intervention as the “policy of first recourse”.
The central banks of the 5 Emerging Asian Economies have also resorted to
intervention. The surge episodes identified in Table 1 were associated with
significant accumulation of reserves. Focusing on the episodes during the
2000s, Table 2 indicates the extent of reserve accumulation or decumulation
during the these episodes.2 All the surge episodes were associated with
accumulation of reserves. While India had built 78% of its end-2011 reserve
holdings during these surge episodes, Indonesia and Thailand accumulated
39.5% and 26.7% of their reserves during such episodes.
2Data on actual intervention by the central bank would be a better indicator to exclude
valuation change. However, such data is not available for all the economies in our sample.
Hence we use the change in reserves as a proxy for intervention.
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Figure 5: Configuration of the Trilemma Objectives and International Re-
serves
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Table 2: Reserve Accumulation During Surge and Stop Episodes
Surge Stop
Episode Reserve Accumulation Episode Reserve Accumulation
Start End Growth Absolute Start End Growth Absolute
(%) ($ Billion) (%) ($ Billion)
India Q3 2003 Q2 2004 45.2% 35.93 Q3 2008 Q3 2009 -10.6% -32.02
Q4 2004 Q3 2005 19.9% 22.96
Q4 2006 Q2 2008 90.4% 143.77
Q1 2010 Q4 2010 3.8% 10.09
Indonesia Q4 2005 Q1 2006 32.8% 9.47 Q4 2006 Q1 2007 11.9% 4.84
Q4 2010 Q2 2011 39.1% 32.64 Q1 2009 Q3 2009 20.9% 10.38
Korea Q1 2008 Q2 2009 -11.6% -30.49
Malaysia Q4 2005 Q3 2006 -0.5% -0.44
Q3 2008 Q2 2009 -27.4% -34.33
Thailand Q3 2004 Q1 2006 27.1% 11.45 Q1 2007 Q4 2007 30.5% 19.93
Q3 2010 Q1 2011 23.1% 33.15 Q3 2008 Q3 2009 25.1% 25.90
Source: IMF’s International Financial Statistics and Authors’ Estimates.
Table 2 also shows that the stop episodes were not universally associated
with depletion of reserves. In fact, in only 4 out of the 8 stop episodes
the EAEs used reserves to counter the stop of capital inflow. This raises
a question as to whether the EAEs central banks have been intervening in
an asymmetric manner in the foreign exchange market i.e. accumulating re-
serves during increase in capital flows to stem appreciation of the domestic
currency but adopting a hands-off approach during stops of capital flows,
and allowing the currency to depreciate. In order to empirically investigate
this, we frame a loss function of the central bank following Pontines and
Rajan (2011) and Sen Gupta and Sengupta (2014), and then use GMM
methodology to estimate the asymmetric preference parameter for all the
EAEs in our sample for the period 2000-2011. Details of the model, estima-
tion strategy and results are described in the Appendix in Section 4.3.
We find that the effect of interventions in the foreign exchange markets was
sought to be sterilized by the central banks of these EAEs with varying re-
sults. In India, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) initially conducted open
market sales of government securities to neutralize the effect of reserve ac-
cretion on monetary base. However, by end of 2003, the RBI had exhausted
its stock of government securities, and in January 2004 introduced the Mar-
ket Stabilization Scheme (MSS) bonds. The RBI could sell these bonds on
the behalf of the government for the purpose of sterilization. As a share of
GDP, outstanding MSS bonds reached a peak of nearly 4% in 2007. How-
ever, during the GFC, the amount of outstanding MSS bonds was drawn
down rapidly to inject liquidity. An useful feature of these bonds were that
they made the cost of sterilization more transparent as the interest pay-
ments had to be reported in the federal budget. Apart from these bonds,
the RBI also raised the reserve requirements to restrain the expansion of
money supply.
Like India, Korea also attempted to use the central bank’s own Monetary
Stabilization Bonds (MSBs) to offset the impact of intervention in the foreign
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exchange market. However, a rising stock of MSBs due to several years of
intervention resulted in making these interventions more and more costly.
The Korean government assisted in sterilization of the capital inflows by
selling the government securities and depositing the proceeds with the Bank
of Korea (BOK). The ratio of outstanding MSBs to GDP reached a peak
of 20% in 2005 before declining to around 11% in 2011. Like RBI in India,
BOK also raised the average reserve requirements for the commercial banks
to contain the growth in money supply.
Indonesia also attempted to partially sterilize its interventions in the foreign
currency market. It used the one month and three month Bank Indonesia
Certificates (SBI) to sterilize the interventions. However, the high interest
rate on these SBIs, made them an attractive instrument, especially as non-
residents were allowed to invest in SBIs. Thus sterilized intervention in
Indonesia resulted in attracting more portfolio inflows. The share of central
bank securities to GDP reached a peak of 2% in 2007. However, during the
GFC the stock of these bonds were quickly drawn down. In 2010 and 2011
there has been again some increase in issuance of such bonds.
Both Malaysia and Thailand resorted to a number of instruments for liq-
uidity management. Massive inflow of foreign capital through portfolio in-
vestment also necessitated Bank Negara Malaysia conducting sterilization to
prevent inflationary pressures. In Malaysia, the interventions were sterilized
using direct borrowing, repos and the issuance of Bank Negara Malaysia
Monetary Notes (BNMNs). As a share of GDP, the volume of outstanding
central bank securities reached a peak of 13% just before the onset of the
GFC. Like most other EAEs, there was a decline in the ratio during the
GFC, before a sharp increase in 2010 and 2011 to pre-crisis peak levels.
The Bank of Thailand had also been intervening in the foreign exchange
market intensively during the 2000s to resist appreciation of the domestic
currency. The principal absorption instrument used by Thailand in the
Bank of Thailand (BOT) bond. Thailand used these bonds alongwith repo
transactions and foreign exchange swaps to manage overall liquidity. The
stock of central bank securities have steadily increased as a share of GDP,
and stood close to 10% in 2011.
3.3 Capital Controls and Impact
Apart from Trilemma management and sterilized intervention, an alterna-
tive macroeconomic policy tool to deal with capital flows is using capital
controls i.e. residency-based restrictions on the cross- border movement of
capital. Capital controls hardly constitute a new topic in the international
finance arena and have been discussed by academics and policy makers alike
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over a fairly long period of time. A distrust of hot money was behind James
Tobin’s initial proposal to throw sand in the wheels of international finance
as noted in his seminar paper (Tobin (1978)).
In recent times emerging economies have begun using controls-both on in-
flows and outflows, to manage volatile and potentially disruptive capital
flows. Typically, emerging economies encourage capital inflows during their
recovery from a financial crisis; however, as they continue to grow and ex-
perience rising appreciation pressures on their domestic currency, managing
large scale volatile capital flows begins to pose serious challenges and sub-
sequently capital controls re-appear in the policy discussions (Magud et al.
(2011)).
There are usually two types of controls: administrative and market-based,
of which the latter happen to be more transparent, and instead of directly
prohibiting capital flows, they discourage cross-border transactions by in-
creasing transaction costs. There has so far been no clear and unanimous
evidence on the overall effectiveness of capital controls. The recent GFC has
been a turning point in the world-view on capital controls, just as a similar
reassessment was done in the aftermath of the AFC of 1997-98. The issue
of regulation of capital flows has slowly but steadily moved to the center
stage from earlier being confined to the periphery of mainstream policy dis-
course. Ex-ante management of capital flows is now accepted as a legitimate
instrument of in countries macroeconomic policy toolkit.
The IMF, a one-time proponent of complete liberalization of the capital
account, has also shifted in favor of the idea that capital controls can be
useful as a last resort when a country faces a net capital inflow surge and
after other macroeconomic policy options have been exhausted (Ostry et al.
(2011)). The IMF position (Ostry et al. (2010)) goes further in suggesting
that capital controls be used in the pursuit of macroeconomic management.
The impact of controls on the magnitude and composition of capital flows, on
transactional frictions, monetary policy, rates in different financial markets,
asset prices etc., have been a subject of enormous debate with very little
consensus on the issue. Effectiveness of capital controls varies with initial
conditions as well as across countries and time periods. To the extent that
there are country specific characteristics that make capital controls effective,
understanding individual country experiences with capital controls gains
significance (Patnaik and Shah (2012)).
For the five EAEs in our sample, the decade of the 2000s running up to the
GFC was characterized by a series of common factors both global as well
as domestic such as the Great Moderation, abundance in global liquidity,
low interest rates in advanced economies, stronger domestic macroeconomic
fundamentals in the aftermath of the AFC, emphasis upon accumulation of
reserves to insulate against adverse external shocks, and renewed interest
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among foreign institutional investors to invest in emerging economies in
general, in search of better yields. The capital controls used by the EAEs
during the period 2000-2011 were largely a function of these factors. In
most cases, these economies were seen relaxing controls on inflows as well as
outflows to take advantage of the surge in global liquidity during their crisis-
recovery period on one hand and on the other hand, relaxing outflow controls
to mitigate the concomitant effects of inflows on domestic financial markets.
In what follows, we provide a concise description some of the major capital
controls used by the five EAEs between 2000 and 2011 and try to connect
the same with the surge and stop episodes identified earlier in this paper.3
Subsequently, we also assess the impact of capital controls on exchange
market pressure (EMP) indices, real and nominal effective exchange rates
and stock market returns.
There is significant heterogeneity across the four South East countries in
our sample as regards their policy responses to the AFC of 1997-98. While
Malaysia rejected the conventional policies proposed by the IMF and im-
posed a series of comprehensive capital controls on short-term capital inflows
as well as outflows and pegged the Ringgit to the dollar, Korea went to the
other extreme by adopting the prescriptions of the IMF and the World Bank
and lifted all capital account and foreign exchange restrictions in a big-bang
move, thereby taking the capital account openness of the country to the
same level as advanced economies.
In Malaysia, the capital controls introduced in the immediate aftermath
of the AFC were successively relaxed and eventually removed by the early
2000s and the transition was made to a managed floating exchange rate
regime by July 2005 (Athukorala and Jongwanich (2012)). Over the next
several years (especially from 2004 onwards), the BNM gradually liberalized
restriction on both capital inflows and outflows. For instance in April 2004,
resident individuals with foreign currency funds were allowed to invest freely
in any foreign currency product offered by onshore licensed banks and the
limit for banking institutions on loans to non residents was raised from
RM200,000 to RM10,000,000. From around this time gross capital outflows
picked up and continued going up till the GFC, as shown in Figure 2. In
April 2005, another series of outflow controls were relaxed. Residents were
allowed to invest abroad in foreign currency and those with domestic credit
3By now there is a sizeable literature that has looked into the responses of the South
East Asian economies to the Asian financial crisis and analyzed the impact of the capital
controls in the immediate aftermath of the crisis. See for instance, Ariyoshi et al. (2000),
Tamirisa (2004), Reinhart and Edison (2001), Dornbusch (2001), among others. Hence
we decided to focus on the decade of 2000-2011. Also we have detailed information on
the capital controls used by these countries for this period and not beyond that. Fur-
thermore, the period after 2011 becomes more complex and volatile to study, with the
onset of quantitative easing policies adopted by advanced economies followed by tapering
announcements made by the US Federal Reserve in the summer of 2013.
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facilities were permitted to convert Ringgit up to RM100,000 per annum.
Likewise corporations were allowed to convert Ringgit up to RM10 million
per annum for investment in foreign currency assets. Residents were also
free to open a foreign currency account (FCA) onshore or offshore, without
any prior permission and no limit on the amount of foreign currency funds
to be retained. Alongside this, the aggregate limit for foreign currency
borrowing by individuals was increased from RM5 million to RM10 million
equivalent (Athukorala and Jongwanich (2012)). Although capital inflows
declined sharply during the GFC, no new capital control was imposed to
deal with the Stop episode from 2008Q3 to 2009Q2.
As mentioned earlier, in the aftermath of the AFC, Korea went to the other
extreme compared with Malaysia and adopted measures to completely lib-
eralize capital flows. As a result of the extensive capital market opening
undertaken by the Korean government, inflows increased significantly from
1999 onwards and Korea ended up having a fully liberalized capital account.
In early 2000s there was a surge in short-term borrowing by foreign banks
and in 2003, foreign investment in the domestic stock market reached a
record high of USD14.4 billion (Kim and Yang (2012)). However no surge
episode was recorded during this period as seen in Figure 2. IN order to
mitigate the adverse impact of the massive inflows of short-term capital into
the domestic financial markets, Korean government adopted measures to
liberalize capital outflows. For instance in 2006, the limit on outward FDI
by domestic residents was relaxed to include purchase of real estate and in
2007, a temporary tax exemption for 3 years was applied to capital gains
generated from overseas stock investment by domestic companies. As a re-
sult as can be seen in Figure 2 gross capital outflows kept increasing from
2006 onwards running into the GFC.
In somewhat similar lines Indonesia, instead of adopting strict capital con-
trols to counter the massive capital flight during and after the AFC, relaxed
restrictions on FDI inflows and shifted to a managed floating exchange rate
regime abandoning the pre-crisis peg to the dollar. Until mid 2000s, macroe-
conomic policies were constrained by agreements with IMF and the country
was experiencing major macroeconomic turbulence, persistent capital out-
flows, high currency volatility, depreciation pressures on the exchange rate,
inflationary pressures and so on. From the mid 2000s onwards, favorable
changes in the political climate, transition into a functioning democracy
and reforms in financial and banking institutions triggered a gradual pro-
cess of economic recovery (Jayasuriya and Chen-Yu Leu (2012)) and capital
inflows began increasing. Several measures were adopted to check the influx
of short-term capital flows. In 2004, BI introduced a Rupiah stabilization
package under which new prudential regulations on net open foreign ex-
change positions of commercial banks hindered their ability to speculate
in the swap market. Around the same time, deposit accounts in Rupiah
20
were subjected to a reserve requirement in the 5-8% range depending on
the total amount of deposits. In 2005Q1, short-term borrowings by banks
were limited to 20% of bank capital. These restrictions adopted primar-
ily to restrain destabilizing short-term inflows and guard against potential
instability in the capital markets by restricting the activities of the com-
mercial banks, could have led to the stop episode recorded in 2006Q4 as
seen in Figure 2. Once the economy recovered from the intial shock of the
GFC in 2008-09, large portfolio inflows resumed again; excessive short-term
inflows resulted in real exchange rate appreciation. Indonesia experienced
a second surge episode in 2010Q4. Once again, restrictions were imposed
on speculative transactions and new capital control measures (prudential
regulations) were introduced to redirect the inflows towards longer maturity
assets (Jayasuriya and Chen-Yu Leu (2012)).
Thailand had a similar experience with imposing market based capital re-
strictions in response to a surge in short term inflows. Rising global liquid-
ity, sluggish economic growth in advanced countries and improving domestic
macro fundamentals in the aftermath of the AFC led to a surge in capital
inflows in the middle of the last decade. A fairly long surge episode was
recorded starting 2004, as seen in Figure 2 and there was also a noticeable
appreciation of the exchange rate. Bank of Thailand (BOT) announced a
series of controls to curb speculative capital inflows, primarily in debt secu-
rities but no significant restrictions were placed on equity investments. For
instance, in September 2003, the amount of Thai baht that onshore finan-
cial institutions could borrow short-term (less than 3 months) from non-
residents was limited to a maximum of B50 million per entity (Jongwanich
and Kohpaiboon (2012)) and in October of the same year, all onshore fi-
nancial institutions were required to limit total daily outstanding balance
on nonresident baht accounts to a maximum of B300 million per nonresi-
dent and were prohibited from paying interest on such current and savings
accounts. This was done to reduce the incentive for deposits in nonresident
baht accounts. When in spite of these measures, short-term inflows con-
tinued unabated and appreciation pressures on the Thai baht still did not
subside, BOT implemented a market-based restriction in December 2006.
This involved a requirement to deposit 30% of foreign exchange as unremu-
nerated reserve requirement (URR) for all foreign transactions, except those
related to trade, FDI and repatriation of investment abroad by residents.
If funds remained within Thailand for 1 year, then the full amount of capi-
tal would be refunded and if funds wee repatriated earlier, only two-thirds
would be refunded. This kind of a market-based capital inflow restriction
that raises the costs of financial transactions without directly prohibiting the
same, belongs to the category of implicit taxation on cross-border financial
flows. Imposition of the URR immediately caused panic amongst foreign
investors in financial markets. The adverse reaction led BOT to exempt 10
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categories of capital inflows from URR the following day. In January 2007,
provisions of additional option were announced for certain type of inflows to
either withhold URR or hedge against foreign exchange risks. Right after
the URR was imposed, a stop episode was recorded in Thailand in 2007Q1.
Net capital outflows increased substantially reaching USD17 billion in 2007.
So it seems that the URR introduction in Thailand succeeded in reducing
the overall volume of capital inflows When capital inflows reacted adversely
to the URR imposition, in December 2007, foreign currency borrowings not
exceeding USD1 million and with a maturity of least 1 year were exempted
from the URR and hedging requirements; eventually the URR measures
were lifted in March 2008 (Jongwanich and Kohpaiboon (2012)). At the
same time, during the early and mid 2000s, capital outflows were progres-
sively liberalized in FDI, equity and debt, in order to promote domestic
residents foreign investments, open up alternative investment opportunities
and also to ease the rising appreciation pressure on the Baht. Institutional
investors were allowed to invest more in foreign securities. In January 2007
for instance, the amount of Thai direct investment or lending to a business
abroad was increased from a maximum of USD10 million per year to USD50
million per year and the scope and number of institutional investors were
expanded as well. Furthermore, in December 2007, the scope for investment
and lending abroad for Thai companies was raised and the limit for purchase
of properties abroad was increased from USD1 million to USD5 million. The
relaxation of outflow controls continued during the GFC as well as after the
crisis. In the aftermath of the GFC, Thai residents resumed overseas invest-
ments in 2009 encouraged by Thailands economic recovery. Capital outflows
were primarily bank loans, debt securities and FDI reflecting the trend in rest
of the South East Asian economies (Jongwanich and Kohpaiboon (2012)).
India, like several other emerging market economies, has long had a complex
and extensive system of administrative controls to deal with volatile capital
flows. While India has been gradually opening up to capital inflows since
the liberalization reforms of 1991, it is still much less open than other major
emerging countries. During the last two decades India followed a gradual,
albeit cautious approach towards financial integration with rest of the world,
prioritizing non-debt creating flows such as portfolio investment flows over
debt flows. Currently, barring a few sectors, FDI is universally allowed.
Portfolio flows have also witnessed significant liberalization, although there
exist separate investment caps on sub accounts of foreign institutional in-
vestors (FIIs), individual FII and aggregate FII investment in a company.
In contrast, debt flows are subject to numerous restrictions including bor-
rowers and lenders having to satisfy eligibility conditions, minimum ma-
turity period, cap on all-in-cost payments made by corporate and end-use
restrictions (Sen Gupta and Sengupta (2014)). When emerging economies
witnessed a universal capital surge in the 2000s, India received amongst the
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highest capital inflows, to the extent that India recorded as many as three
surge episodes in the run up to the GFC as seen in Figure 2. Capital flows
to India increased steadily from around USD10 billion a year in the early
2000s, to USD100 billion a year by early 2008. Abiad et al. (2010) show
that restrictions on the capital account were eased between 1999 and 2004,
though since then the process of liberalization seems to have slowed down
(Patnaik and Shah (2012)). While controls on capital outflows were eased
after 2006, restrictions on inflows were further tightened, especially after the
3rd surge episode was recorded in 2006Q4. In January 2007, the ceiling on
interest rates on non-resident bank deposits were reduced; in May of the
same year, external commercial borrowings (ECB) by real estate companies
were banned and interest rate ceiling on ECB were reduced; and in August,
companies borrowing more than USD20 million in ECB were stopped from
remitting funds. However, despite the measures announced to reduce the
volume of capital inflows, the surge episode lasted seven quarters till 2008Q2
right before the onset of the GFC. With net capital flows of USD98 billion
during 2007, India was the biggest recipient of capital flows amongst emerg-
ing markets during this period (Patnaik and Shah (2012)). Thus in a way it
can be concluded that for India the comprehensive set of legal capital con-
trols were not sufficient to restrict the influx of capital. On the other hand
outflow controls have been successively and significantly liberalized since
2006. The most visible manifestation of this policy has been the increasing
cross-border acquisitions by Indian companies.
To formally assess the impact of selected capital controls on the exchange
rate and stock market we undertake means comparison test before and after
the introduction of capital controls. This involves looking at the difference
in the means of the variables before and after the introduction of controls.
In particular, we focus on movements in exchange rate and stock prices as a
primary reason for imposition of controls is to restrain increase in the value
of the domestic currency and stock prices. To be deemed effective these
measures must reverse or at least slowdown the rate of appreciation and
increase in stock prices observed prior to their introduction.
We focus on 4 selected measures aimed to curb inflow of foreign capital.4
These include
• India – Imposition of restrictions on ‘participatory notes’ in October
2007 to curb portfolio investment inflows. These are over-the-counter
derivatives sold by a Foreign Institutional Investment registered fi-
nancial firm to an investor, who is not registered Patnaik and Shah
(2012).
• Indonesia – The required holding period on foreign capital inflows and
4We focus on capital controls imposed in India, Indonesia, Korea and Thailand.
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central bank notes in July 2010 were increased to 1 month, and central
banks instruments with longer maturity of 6 months and 9 months
were introduced (Magud et al. (2013)).
• Korea – In August 2007, the government restricted the use of foreign
borrowings by allowing such funds only for real demand and invest-
ment in the manufacturing sector (Kim and Yang (2012)).
• Thailand – In December 2006 Bank of Thailand required all foreign
transactions, barring those related to trade in goods and services, repa-
triation of investment abroad by residents, and FDI, had to deposit
30% of foreign exchange with the BOT as URR. If these funds re-
mained within Thailand for one year, 30% of capital was refunded.
If funds repatriated before a year, only two-thirds of the amount was
refunded (Jongwanich and Kohpaiboon (2012).
Table 3 highlight the efficacy of the capital controls in restricting exchange
rate appreciation and stock price increase. To look at the short term and
longer term effect of these measures, we focus on periods covering one-month
and six-month before and after the imposition of these controls.
Table 3: Testing the Validity of the Trilemma Framework
Exchange Rate
One Month Six Months
Before After Difference Before After Difference
India (October 2007) 1.050% -0.066% 1.116%** 0.269% -0.089% 0.36%
[1.993] [1.494]
Indonesia (July 2010) 0.123% 0.043% 0.080% 0.029% 0.006% 0.023%
[0.551] [0.355]
Korea (July 2007) 0.073% -0.123% 0.195%** 0.019% -0.028% 0.047%
[1.832] [1.255]
Thailand (December 2006) 0.174% 0.003% 0.171% 0.069% 0.077% -0.008%
[0.847] [-0.076]
Stock Market
One Month Six Months
Before After Difference Before After Difference
India (October 2007) 1.050% -0.066% 1.116%** 0.269% -0.089% 0.358%
[1.993] [1.494]
Indonesia (July 2010) 0.274% 0.111% 0.163% 0.107% 0.222% -0.115%
[0.581] [-0.711]
Korea (July 2007) 0.632% -0.494% 1.123%** 0.304% -0.119% 0.423%**
[1.692] [2.218]
Thailand (December 2006)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate correlations significant at 10%, 5%,
and 1% respectively Source: Authors Calculations
In the short-term we find some evidence on the efficacy of capital controls
in restraining exchange rate appreciation in India and Korea. In both these
economies there was a significant reversal in the trend of exchange rate
appreciation witnessed before the imposition of the control. However, we do
not find similar evidence for controls imposed in Thailand and Indonesia.
There was a drop in the pace of appreciation but the difference was not
significant. Moreover, when we extend our window to six months we find
that the difference between pre- and post capital control period drops out.
Wefind similar evidence for the impact of the capital account management
measures on stock price increase. Again, in case of both India and Korea, we
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find that the measures were able to reverse the trend of stock price increase
when we consider the one-month window. However, when we increase the
period under study to six-months the difference is significant only in case of
Korea.
It seems from the above discussion that by and large for these EAEs, while
capital controls did not succeed in controlling surge episodes, once the surge
was recorded and new capital controls were implemented, there was mod-
erate success in lowering the volume of gross inflows in some cases such as
in Thailand and Indonesia in 2006-07 but the success was not perceptibly
evident in other cases such as India. Moreover, these controls were able to
reverse the trend of strengthening currency and rising stock prices only in
a couple of countries. Furthermore, the effect lasted only for a short-term
and disappeared over a longer horizon. Hence the overall impact of capital
controls on managing the volume of gross flows appears to be a mixed bag.
3.3.1 Exchange Market Pressure Index (EMPI)
A central banks management of capital account could be driven by a desire
to moderate certain types of capital inflows or to manage exchange rate sta-
bility. In the context of the trilemma trade offs faced by these EAEs during
the period under consideration, it may be reasonable to conjecture that the
goal was the latter. Accordingly in this section we measure the exchange
market pressure (EMP) for all five EAEs, and discuss the evolution of the
series over time. EMP is a combination of exchange rate depreciation and
international reserves loss-a concept pioneered by Girton and Roper (1977),
and applied frequently in the analysis of EMEs (Frankel (2009)). A positive
(negative) EMP indicates a net excess demand (supply) for foreign currency,
accompanied by a combination of reserve loss (gain) and currency depreci-
ation (appreciation). In order to measure EMP, we follow the methodology
of Aizenman et al. (2012) who investigate the factors explaining EMP in
emerging markets during the 2000s. The simplest measure of EMP is the
un-weighted sum of percentage nominal depreciation and percentage loss of
reserves. For this we use the nominal bilateral exchange rate of each country
against the US dollar and international reserves minus gold. Figure 6 shows
the evolution of the EMP series in each of the five EAEs from 2000 to 2011.
For India, for a large part of the sample period EMP has been negative
till the GFC of 2008Q3 when EMP series of all five EAEs display a jump
reflecting capital outflows and exchange rate depreciation triggered by a
sharp rise in global macroeconomic volatility in the wake of the collapse of
the Lehman Brothers in September 2008. A negative EMP in India from
2000Q4 to 2008Q1 implying net excess supply of foreign currency, is consis-
tent with the surge in capital inflows experienced by the economy during this
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Figure 6: Exchange Market Pressure Indices
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(b)Indonesia
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(e)Thailand
Source: Authors’ Estimates.
26
period, accompanied by exchange rate appreciation and a remarkable rise
in the stock of international reserves. During this period the Indian econ-
omy experienced on average a 7% combined nominal currency appreciation
and gains in international reserve holdings. This also coincides with the pe-
riod of Great Moderation in the global economy during which all emerging
economies in general were experiencing nominal currency appreciation and
massive accumulation of international reserves (Sen Gupta and Sengupta
(2014)). The downward/negative trend in the EMP through the early and
mid 2000s gets interrupted by a sharp upward movement between 2008Q2
and 2009Q1the period of global economic and financial turbulence center-
ing around the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the US. Between 2008Q1
and 2008Q4, India went from an average 11% combined nominal apprecia-
tion and gains in international reserve holdings to a 14% combined nominal
depreciation and international reserve loss. EMP in India came down by
2009Q2 and switched back to net nominal currency appreciation combined
with hoarding international reserves. This trend continued in India till the
end of 2010. Since then however the EMP has been on the rise again given
the capital outflows and massive currency depreciation that India experi-
enced in the wake of the Euro-zone sovereign debt crisis.
In case of Indonesia the EMP series is seen to be a lot more volatile towards
the start of the sample period when the EMP was off and on in the pos-
itive range. This is reflective of the fact that during the aftermath of the
AFC Indonesian economy was experiencing continuing political instability,
persistent net capital outflows, rising inflationary pressures and heightened
exchange rate volatility accompanied by frequent foreign exchange market
intervention by the BI. This was the period when Indonesias macroeconomic
policies were determined and hence constrained by an agreement with the
IMF that entailed maintaining an open capital account, and floating the
exchange rate. By 2003 inflationary pressures were controlled through tar-
geting base money and rate of capital outflows decelerated (Jayasuriya and
Chen-Yu Leu (2012)); the EMP can be seen to have declined around this
time. However currency pressures still continued and in 2004 the Rupiah
began depreciating again as reflected in an upward movement in the EMP
series in Figure 6. The BI intervened to control currency speculation and
announced a Rupiah stabilization package in June 2004 as mentioned earlier.
Consequently, the currency volatility was somewhat curbed, capital inflows
recovered and by end 2005 Indonesia experienced a surge episode in capital
flows as reflected in negative EMP values running up to the GFC. EMP shot
up during the crisis period due to renewed pressure on the Rupiah. However
the economy rebounded strongly and fairly quickly after the crisis and began
to grow again from 2009 onwards. Around this time EMP declined as well
till of course the Euro zone crisis hit and 2011Q3 onwards EMP went up
again. The crisis and post crisis trends in EMP between 2008Q3 and 2011Q4
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are quite similar across the countries in our sample. Talking of similarity,
the EMP series of Korea is almost exactly like that of India reflecting the
common phenomenon both these economies experienced during the decade
of the 2000smassive inflows of foreign capital triggered by abundant global
liquidity, high interest rate differential with the advanced countries of the
West, and consistently robust growth registered by these economies, reflect-
ing the general trend around this time of capital from the developed world
chasing yields in the emerging world. During 200Q1-2007Q4, the Korean
economy experienced on average a 5% combined nominal currency appreci-
ation and gains in international reserve holdings. Like the other EAEs this
trend was interrupted by the GFC and associated liquidity crunch world-
wide, worsening risk perceptions and capital flight, all of which resulted in
a sharp upward movement in the EMP index. Consequently the Korean
government adopted measures in the aftermath of the crisis to insulate the
domestic financial markets from further instability. Supervision of foreign
bank branches was strengthened, the liquidity of domestic financial firms
was more tightly regulated than the pre-crisis period, and risk management
of foreign transactions was improved. Once the economy recovered from the
initial shock, capital inflows resumed and the exchange market pressure was
somewhat reduced until the currency came under renewed strains owing to
the Euro zone crisis towards the end of our sample period.
The EMP story for Malaysia and Thailand are also more or less similar to
the other EAEs; on average in the first half of the sample period, the EMP
indices were negative implying exchange rate appreciation and reserves accu-
mulation owing to capital inflows and economies recovering from the AFC
and hoarding of precautionary savings to guard against further economic
shocks; this trend continued till the GFC when EMP went up due to these
economies like others, experiencing capital stop episodes, currency depreci-
ation and loss of reserves. Finally as the economies recovered from the GFC
and started attracting foreign capital back, EMP improved though only to
come under renewed pressure when the sovereign debt crisis got triggered
in the peripheral states of the Euro zone. In case of Malaysia one difference
was that till 2005Q3, all changes in the EMP were reflective of change in the
international reserves stock since the Ringgit was pegged to the US dollar till
then. In Thailand while the BOT imposed the URR restriction on capital
inflows in December 2006 to control the influx of short-term volatile capital,
it did not seem to have much of an impact on the EMP index, which con-
tinued to be negative even after this. Thus one could say that even though
some of these EAEs experimented with capital controls from time to time
to prevent capital inflow surges, the impact of these controls on the EMP
index was hardly significant. The EMP indices of all five EAEs display a
remarkably symmetric trend during this time period.
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4 Conclusion
Gross capital inflows and outflows to and from emerging market economies
(EMEs) have witnessed a significant increase since early 2000s. This rapid
increase in the volume of flows accompanied by sharp swings in volatil-
ity has amplified the complexity of macroeconomic management in EMEs
thereby exacerbating overall financial instability. It has been widely agreed
that the rise in the volatility of capital flows that the EMEs have been sub-
jected to in recent years was not so much a consequence of developments in
these countries. During the pre-global financial crisis period, foreign capital
poured into several EMEs driven by their encouraging growth prospects,
easy global liquidity and declining home bias in the advanced economies.
This exuberance however turned out to be short-lived. The outbreak of
the subprime crisis and collapse of the Lehman Brothers in the USA in the
second half of 2008 led to a sharp decline in the risk appetite of global in-
vestors and prompted a large scale flight to safety of international capital
from EMEs. The subsequent reverse surge in capital flows back to EMEs in
late 2010 and early 2011 was a result of widening interest rate differentials
owing to near-zero interest rates prevailing in advanced economies. How-
ever, the deepening of the Euro-zone sovereign debt crisis and a downgrade
of US sovereign rating in the second half of 2011 caused investor sentiment
to deteriorate once again and net capital flows to plunge across most EMEs.
While capital inflows provide additional financing for productive investment
and offer avenues for risk diversification, unbridled flows could also inflate
asset price bubbles, and lead to exchange rate overshooting, contributing
to financial fragilities; in particular sudden surges and stops could pose
serious macroeconomic challenges. In this paper we focus exclusively on five
major emerging Asian economies (EAEs), namely India, Indonesia, Korea,
Malaysia and Thailand and evaluate the role and effectiveness of the various
measures and policies implemented by these countries to manage capital flow
surges and stops over the period 2000-2011. In doing so the paper attempts
to enrich the current debate ongoing in global policy circles on the efficacy
of such measures. This kind of an analysis is highly relevant especially
at a time when EMEs are about to face the repercussions of a potential
Quantitative Easing (QE) tapering by the US or launch of fresh QE measures
by the Euro-zone, either of which could once again exacerbate the volatility
of cross-border capital flows thereby resulting in renewed complexities in
macroeconomic management in major EMEs.
While we analyze specific country case studies, it is also worthwhile to note
in this context that individual countries managing destabilizing capital flows
through their unilaterally decided policies without taking into consideration
the impact on other countries in the region, can also have potential disrup-
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tive consequences in the medium run. For instance, as each capital-receiving
country introduces measures to reduce volatile capital flows in support of
domestic financial stability, it may deflect some capital flows towards other
recipient countries, exacerbating their inflow problem and policies in orig-
inating countries, to the degree they increase the volume of capital flows,
may aggravate problems faced by capital-receiving countries. Hence it is
important for multilateral organizations and groups such as the IMF, World
Bank, G20, OECD, and the like to think of global solutions that involve
regional co-operation and co-ordination across countries in the implementa-
tion of such policy measures such that the interests of the originators and
recipients of capital as well as other countries affected by these policies can
be taken into consideration. The scope of alternative policies to deal with
capricious capital flows should also be explored in further detail such as
developing domestic financial and banking institutions through robust and
sustained reforms, and stimulating domestic private investment in countries
with low investment and private consumption in countries with excess sav-
ings.
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Appendix I: Computing Surge and Stop Episodes
Let Ct be the four-quarter moving sum of gross capital inflows (GINFLOW),
and compute annual year over year changes in Ct. Thus
Ct =
3∑
i=0
GINFLOWt−i (1)
and ∆Ct = Ct-Ct−4. Next, we compute the rolling means and standard
deviations of ∆Ct over the last 5 years. Forbes and Warnock (2012) identify
surge as an episode, which starts in the month when ∆Ct increases more
than one standard deviation above its rolling mean. The episode ends once
∆Ct falls below one standard deviation above its mean. Similarly, a “stop”
episode covers the period when gross inflows decline one standard deviation
below its mean. Furthermore, for the period to qualify as a surge episode,
there must be at least one quarter when ∆Ct increases by a minimum of
two standard deviation above its rolling mean. Similarly, a stop episode is
defined as the period over which gross capital inflows fall one standard devia-
tion below its rolling mean, and provided it reaches two standard deviations
below at some time during the period.
Appendix II: Computing Trilemma Indices
Monetary Independence: The extent of monetary independence is mea-
sured as the inverse of the quarterly correlation of the interest rates be-
tween EAEs and their base country. Here, the base country is defined as the
country that a home countrys monetary policy is most closely linked with.
Aizenman et al. (2010) indicate that the base country for all these 5 EAEs
is the United States. The quarterly indices are calculated using weekly 3-
month Treasury Bill yields for India and the US. The index of Monetary
Independence is given by
MI = 1− corr(ij , i
US)− (−1)
1− (−1) (2)
where ij refers to the interest rate prevailing in the EAEs, i
US refers to the
US interest rates and corr(ij , i
∗), refers to the correlation of these interest
rates over a quarter, and provides evidence on co-movement of domestic
and foreign interest rates. By definition, corr(ij , i
US), can take a maximum
value of +1 and a minimum value of −1. The monetary independence index
(MI) is thus a min-max normalization of this correlation. It is obtained by
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subtracting the minimum value (−1) from the observed correlation and then
divided by the range of values, which is a difference between the maximum
and the minimum value. Thus the monetary independence index can theo-
retically take a value between 0 and 1 with a higher value indicating greater
degree of monetary independence.
Exchange Rate Stability: We make use of the methodology introduced
by Frankel and Wei (1994) to create an index of exchange rate stability. The
degree of influence that major global currencies have on Indian Rupee can
be estimated using the following estimation model.
∆logSDRj,t = α0+βj,USD∆log
SDR
USD,t+βj,EUR∆log
SDR
EUR,t+βj,JPY ∆log
CHF
SDR,t+νt
(3)
Where SDRj,t is the value of the 5 EAEs’ currency j against the numraire
currency, which in this case is the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights. The
three major global currencies, US Dollar, Japanese Yen and the Euro, can
be viewed as making up the implicit currency basket, which the different
EAEs are targeting to a different degree. Here βˆj,k where k = USD, EUR
and JPY, which is the estimated coefficient on the rate of change in the
exchange rate for major global currency, represents the weight of currency
k in the implicit basket. In the case where the EAE currency is pegged to
a particular currency or a basket of currency, either βˆj,k = 1 or
K∑
k=1
βˆj,k = 1
for K currencies that are a part of the basket. Moreover, pegging to an
individual or a basket of currencies implies a higher goodness of fit.
Under this estimation, which is the estimated coefficient on the rate at which
currency i depreciates against the numraire currency indicates the weight of
currency i in the basket. In the case where the currency under observation is
pegged to a particular currency or a basket of currency we will have or for i
currencies that are a part of the basket. Moreover, pegging to an individual
or a basket of currencies implies a higher goodness of fit. In our estimation
we use daily data, with the data being sourced from the Database on the
Indian Economy, Reserve Bank of India and Global Financial Database.
We apply the estimation over a quarter and take the goodness of fit, or the
adjusted R2 as the measure of exchange rate stability (ERS). A higher R2
indicates greater pegging to an individual or a basket of currencies.
Capital Account Openness: We use a de facto measure of capital ac-
count openness for the reason that as it is the actual volume of flows that
creates a conflict between monetary independence and exchange rate stabil-
ity as opposed to controls governing the movement of capital. A country
with high de jure openness can have low capital flows and hence be able to
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simultaneously stabilize exchange rate and retain monetary autonomy. Al-
ternatively, a country with low de jure openness can experience large flows
due to low enforcement of capital controls, and face a trade-off between
ensuring monetary independence and exchange rate stability. Hence, the
index of capital account openness is based on net capital flows. The index is
constructed as the ratio of absolute value of net capital flows to GDP. The
index is normalized to lie between 0 and 1.
CapOpen =
|NKF |
GDP
(4)
Finally, as pointed out in Aizenman et al. (2010), policymakers can garner
greater flexibility vis-a-vis monetary and exchange rate management in the
short run by accumulating or depleting reserves. Consequently we also focus
on ∆Res, the absolute change in reserves (as a percentage of GDP). Like
the capital account openness index we also normalize ∆Res to lie between
0 and 1
4.0.2 Testing Validity of Trilemma Framework
2 = αMIt + βERSt + γCapOpent + µt (5)
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Table 4: Testing the Validity of the Trilemma Framework
2000 Q1 2000 Q1 2004 Q1 2008 Q1
to to to to
2011 Q4 2003 Q4 2007 Q4 2011 Q4
India
Monetary Independence 1.174*** 1.055* 0.115* 2.159***
[3.560] [1.774] [1.661] [3.645]
Exchange Rate Stability 1.439*** 1.880*** 2.250*** 1.662
[7.608] [12.002] [6.458] [0.892]
Capital Account Openness 1.512*** 0.145** 1.844*** 0.484
[3.065] [1.993] [3.472] [0.545]
Observations 48 16 16 16
R-squared 0.906 0.983 0.943 0.891
Indonesia
Monetary Independence 1.003*** 0.957** 1.321*** 0.703*
[4.687] [2.302] [5.106] [1.785]
Exchange Rate Stability 1.989*** 2.372*** 2.685*** 1.909***
[8.557] [6.803] [4.885] [4.204]
Capital Account Openness 1.026*** 1.073* 1.250** 0.642*
[3.538] [2.088] [2.518] [1.887]
Observations 48 16 16 16
R-squared 0.863 0.883 0.914 0.887
Korea
Monetary Independence 1.809*** 1.983*** 1.239* 1.514***
[8.006] [5.536] [1.699] [3.669]
Exchange Rate Stability 1.618*** 1.349** 1.422* 3.058**
[5.041] [2.896] [1.775] [2.446]
Capital Account Openness 2.204*** 3.459** 5.631** 1.641***
[4.780] [2.770] [2.242] [6.942]
Observations 48 16 16 16
R-squared 0.865 0.892 0.859 0.884
Malaysia
Monetary Independence 1.013*** 0.047* 0.638* 1.362***
[4.712] [1.677] [1.764] [9.250]
Exchange Rate Stability 1.535*** 1.885*** 1.679*** 4.012***
[12.049] [20.586] [4.766] [6.859]
Capital Account Openness 1.547*** 0.807* 1.705** 0.134*
[4.178] [1.743] [1.987] [1.738]
Observations 48 16 16 16
R-squared 0.888 0.996 0.852 0.946
Thailand
Monetary Independence 1.039*** 0.765* 1.812*** 0.792*
[3.788] [1.709] [4.836] [1.795]
Exchange Rate Stability 1.901*** 1.644*** 1.314** 1.909***
[11.268] [7.111] [2.944] [6.627]
Capital Account Openness 1.445*** 1.533*** 2.525*** 1.044
[4.335] [3.076] [3.854] [1.755]
Observations 48 16 16 16
R-squared 0.882 0.938 0.865 0.912
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate correlations significant at
10%, 5%, and 1% respectively Source: Authors Calculations
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Appendix III: Estimating Asymmetric Forex Inter-
vention by Central Banks
A representative central bank’s loss function is given as follows:
Lt =
1
2
(Rt −R∗)2 + φ
2
(
(ε˜t − ε∗)2 + θ
3
(ε˜t − ε∗)3
)
(6)
Here ε˜t is the percent change in exchange rate with the exchange rate being
defined as the foreign currency price of the domestic currency while Rt is
the reserves level. The central bank’s objective is to minimize the deviation
of reserves as well as the exchange rate from their respective target values
ε∗ and R∗. Moreover, φ is the relative weight the central bank puts on
stabilizing exchange rate vis-a-vis reserves. The right most term introduces
the asymmetry in the loss function. With θ > 0, an appreciation (ε˜ > 0)
increases the central banks loss while depreciation (ε˜ < 0) reduces the extent
of loss.
The central bank faces a trade-off between stabilizing reserves and exchange
rate simultaneously as interventions can reduce the extent of exchange rate
deviation.
ε˜t − ε∗ = α0 + α1Rt + ηt (7)
where α1 > 0 and ηt is independent and identically distributed with zero
mean and variance . Minimizing equation (6) by choosing Rt, subject to the
constraint given in equation (7) yields the following optimality condition.
Rt = R
∗ − (φα1) ε˜t − φθ
2
α1ε˜
2
t (8)
The optimality condition can be reduced to an empirically testable formu-
lation
Rt = β0 + β1ε˜t + β2ε˜
2
t + υt (9)
where β1 = −φα1 and β2 = −φθ2 α1.
The reduced form parameters provide information on the degree of asym-
metry in exchange rate stabilization with θ = −2β2β1 .
We empirically estimate Equation (9) by using monthly data on nominal
exchange rate and reserves (minus gold) over the period 2000 to 2011. The
data is sourced from IMF’s International Financial Statistics.
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We use the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to estimate Equation
(9). The orthogonality conditions implied by the intertemporal optimization
and rational expectations paradigm make the GMM approach appealing.
Moreover, the GMM approach does not require strong assumptions about
the distribution of shocks. We follow Hansen (1982) and use an optimal
weighting estimate of the covariance matrix, which accounts for auto corre-
lation and heteroskedasticity in the error term. We employ a variable lag
Newey West estimate of the covariance matrix.
In the GMM estimation, a larger set of instruments improves the estimation
performance by including more moment restrictions. However, in relatively
small samples, this comes at the cost of the precision of the weighting ma-
trix. Hence, in our analysis the optimal set of instruments is decided by
Hansen (1982) over-identifying restriction test (J statistics) with a rejection
of these restrictions indicating that some of the variables fail to satisfy the
orthogonality conditions. We use 1 to 12 and 15 lags of Rt and ε˜t, as well
as the current value of federal funds rate and its four lags as instruments.
The estimates of the intervention reaction function and the asymmetric pref-
erence parameter are reported in Table 4. The J-statistic indicates that the
null hypothesis of valid over-identifying restrictions cannot be rejected at
the conventional significance level. We find θ to be positive and significant
across for all 5 EAEs implying that the central banks did pursue asymmet-
ric intervention in the foreign exchange market to counter surges and stops
of capital flows. The standard error for θ are calculated using the Delta
Method.
Table 5: Asymmetric Intervention by EAE Central Banks
Full Sample (2000 to 2011)
India Indonesia Korea Malaysia Thailand
Constant 2.112*** 1.137*** 1.021*** 2.176*** 0.846***
[0.111] [0.095] [0.063] [0.097] [0.089]
β1 -0.419*** -0.357*** -0.425*** -1.169*** -0.772***
[0.042] [0.031] [0.030] [0.055] [0.050]
β2 -0.205*** -0.014*** -0.027*** -0.864*** 0.124***
[0.021] [0.003] [0.004] [0.038] [0.037]
θ 0.978*** 0.078*** 0.127*** 1.478*** 0.321***
[0.045] [0.013] [0.014] [0.037] [0.032]
Observations 128 128 128 128 128
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate correlations significant at 10%,
5%, and 1% respectively Source: Authors Calculations
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